Vulnerabilidad · Publicado 29/09/2026
La función quote() de la librería shell-quote procesa incorrectamente tokens de comentario, permitiendo que un atacante inyecte comandos shell arbitrarios mediante saltos de línea en cadenas de texto. Esta vulnerabilidad afecta aplicaciones Node.js en servidores de LATAM que utilizan shell-quote para sanitización de argumentos, pudiendo comprometer sistemas de CI/CD, contenedores Docker y plataformas de automatización.
shell-quote's `quote()` function emits a `{ comment }` token as `#` followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029) in that later string therefore ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input: `quote(['echo', 'ok', { comment: 'x' }, 'a\nid;#'])` runs `id` in sh, bash, dash, ksh and zsh. `parse()` emits a comment token for a `#` in the middle of a word (for example `http://example.com/#frag`), so callers that combine `parse()` output with another untrusted string, such as `quote(parse(untrustedCommand).concat(untrustedArg))`, are affected. The fix for CVE-2026-9277 rejected line terminators in the comment's own text, but not in the tokens after it. Fixed in 1.11.0: `quote()` throws a `TypeError` when a string after a `{ comment }` token contains a line terminator.
Score: 8.1/10 — Severidad: HIGH — Estado NIST: Received
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE-78
Publicado en NIST NVD.