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Alto CVE-2026-19673 Multiple Vendors

[CVE-2026-19673] ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c validates only that the first net_buf of a rece…

Vulnerabilidad · Publicado 14/10/2026

7.1
CVSS 3.x
04 Medio7 Alto9 Crítico10
Severidad: Alto
Resumen ejecutivo

ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c validates only that the first net_buf of a received frame holds a plain 14-byte struct net_eth_hdr. When the ethertype is 0x8100 and VLAN is enabled on the interface, the same buffer is reinterpreted as the 18-byte struct net_eth_vlan_hdr without re-checking the length: the VLAN TCI and the inner ethertype are read from offsets 14..17, past pkt-…

Descripción técnica

Descripción técnica

ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c validates only that the first net_buf of a received frame holds a plain 14-byte struct net_eth_hdr. When the ethertype is 0x8100 and VLAN is enabled on the interface, the same buffer is reinterpreted as the 18-byte struct net_eth_vlan_hdr without re-checking the length: the VLAN TCI and the inner ethertype are read from offsets 14..17, past pkt->buffer->len, and hdr_len is raised to 18 so the subsequent net_buf_pull() removes more bytes than the buffer holds. A single unauthenticated frame of 14 to 17 bytes carrying the VLAN ethertype triggers this. No knowledge of the node's VLAN configuration is needed: net_eth_get_vlan_iface() returns the base interface for the priority tag 0, and a broadcast destination address satisfies the "frame is for me" test, so a 16-byte broadcast frame with ethertype 0x8100 and TCI 0x0000 reaches the pull. Nothing in the receive path enforces the 60-byte Ethernet minimum — the USB CDC ECM and CDC NCM gadget classes in particular hand host-supplied frames of any non-zero length straight to net_recv_data(). With assertions enabled, net_buf_simple_pull() asserts and the node panics. In a production build (assertions and CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING off) the uint16_t buffer length underflows to 65534 and buf->data is advanced past the end of the fragment's storage, so every later parser reads far outside the buffer and any net_buf_add() on that fragment computes tailroom from the underflowed length. The result is a reliable remote denial of service and out-of-bounds access with information-disclosure and corruption potential. Only configurations built with CONFIG_NET_VLAN=y that have a VLAN enabled on the receiving Ethernet interface, and whose MAC does not strip VLAN tags in hardware (ETHERNET_HW_VLAN_TAG_STRIP), are affected. The fix rejects the frame before the tag is read, so hdr_len is thereafter either 14 or 18 with both sizes validated against pkt->buffer->len.

Puntuación CVSS

Score: 7.1/10 — Severidad: HIGH — Estado NIST: Received

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H

Debilidades (CWE)

CWE-125

Fuente oficial

Publicado en NIST NVD.

¿Qué hacer?
  • Revisar el aviso oficial del fabricante y aplicar los parches o mitigaciones disponibles
  • Consultar las referencias en NIST NVD para actualizaciones de estado
  • Priorizar según el score CVSS y la exposición de los sistemas afectados
Esta alerta fue generada automáticamente a partir del NVD del NIST.