Alertas de Seguridad de la Información

When asking curl to use a `.netrc` file to find credentials and at the same time specifying a URL with a username(without a password), like `https://user@example.com/`, curl could wrongly get and use the password for *another* user set in the `.netrc` file for that host if such a one exists and there is no match for the specified user.

When reusing a libcurl handle for sequential transfers driven by environment-variable proxy configuration, libcurl fails to clear the proxy authentication state between requests. Specifically, if the initial transfer authenticates against `proxyA` using Digest auth, a subsequent transfer routed through `proxyB` erroneously leaks the `Proxy-Authorization:` header intended solely for `proxyA`.

libcurl had a flaw that when instructed to clear proxy authentication credentials which made it not do so, leaving the old credentials around to get used for subsequent transfers that should not know nor use them.

A flaw in curl’s cookie parsing logic allows a malicious HTTP server to set 'super cookies' that bypass the Public Suffix List check. This enables an attacker-controlled origin to inject cookies that curl subsequently scopes and transmits to unrelated third-party domains.

The curl logic that works with SASL authentication could end up cleaning up the GSASL context *twice* without clearing the pointer in between, making it `free()` the same pointer twice.

A use-after-free vulnerability exists in libcurl when an application configures an HTTP/2 stream-dependency tree via `CURLOPT_STREAM_DEPENDS` or `CURLOPT_STREAM_DEPENDS_E`, subsequently invokes `curl_easy_reset()`, and finally terminates the handle with `curl_easy_cleanup()`. During this final cleanup phase, libcurl attempts to access and modify an internal structure that was already freed during …

libcurl keeps previously used connections in a connection pool for subsequent transfers to reuse if one of them matches the setup. An easy handle that first uses default native CA trust can continue trusting the native platform store after the application switches that same handle to custom CA material for a later transfer.

Successfully using libcurl to do a transfer to a specific HTTP origin (`hostA`) with **Digest** authentication and then changing the origin to a different one (`hostB`) for a second transfer, reusing the same handle, makes libcurl wrongly pass on the `Authorization:` header field meant for `hostA`, to `hostB`.